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VOLUNTARY PUBLIC EMPLOYER AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: RECONCILING TITLE VII CONSENT
DECREES WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAIMS OF MAJORITY EMPLOYEES
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' has required many employers to negotiate
structural changes in their hiring and promotion policies in order to redress racial and
sexual discrinaination. 2
 When first enacted, Title VII prohibited racial, sexual, and reli-
gious discrimination only in private sector employment.' In 1972, however, Congress
amended Title VII to include state and local employers as well.' Thus, since 1972 public
sector employers have been subject to the separate and sometimes conflicting require-
ments of Title VII and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Compliance with Title VII often involves specific affirmative action plans' designed
to remedy the effects of prior discrimination." Such affirmative action plans are usually
group oriented and created voluntarily between the minority plaintiffs and their em-
ployer pursuant to a Title VII consent decree.? The terms of the resulting consent decree
also affect the employment rights and prerogatives of majority employees," however —
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
2
 Title Vii makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate in hiring, promotion, or other
employment related practices on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. 42 U.S.C,
2000e-2(a) (1982).
' See, e.g., 110 Corm. Rm. 6,548 (1964). Senator Humphrey stated that "[t]he crux of' the
problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which had been
traditionally closed to them." Id.
4 See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(a), e-(b)( I) (1982). Where relevant to the constitutional inquiry, this note
will distinguish between public and private employers. Otherwise, the Title VII analysis is the same
for public or private employers.
For the purposes of this note, the phrase "affirmative action plan" refers to workplace
preferences based on race or other characteristics protected by Title VII granted to individuals not
the adjudicated victims of unlawful discrimination. See J. LIVINGSTONE, FAIR GAME? INEQUALITY
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION I I (1979) ("affirmative action means preference on the basis of race or
it [means] nothing"), quoted in, Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Tide VII Consent Decrees
and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Dui*: L.J. 887, 892 ti.31.
Affirmative action plans often take the form of hiring and promotion quotas. See, e.g., Bratton
v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 882 (Gth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (one black
police officer promoted for every white police officer until 50% of police lieutenants are black).
A consent decree is a settlement negotiated between the parties which is entered subsequently
as a judgment of' the court, See United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en bane) (Rubin, J., concurring). When the court enters the decree it does not resolve or make
any findings of facts on the merits of the dispute, see id. at 440 (Rubin, J., concurring), although it
may make some limited inquiry into the propriety of the decree. See Note, Collateral Attacks on
Employment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 147 (1986) thereinafter Note, Collateral
Attacks]. One commentator has noted that "between 1972 and 1983, the Justice Department sued
and obtained relief under Title VII against 106 state and local government employers; of these
cases 93 — 88% — were settled by consent decree." See Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 894. Because
consent decrees are flexible, relatively inexpensive, and involve no findings of fact, both minority
plaintiffs and defendant employers often seek a consent decree as the vehicle for resolving 'Title
VII claims.
Throughout this note the term "minority employees" describes plaintiff's who are blacks,
women, or others commonly referred to as minorities. Minority employees, with few exceptions,
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particularly when the decree modifies existing seniority rights. 9 White employees may
be denied promotions or other benefits, and white job applicants may be denied the
employment they might have had absent the affirmative action plan."
Majority employees affected by the consent decrees have, therefore, asserted that
these plans constitute illegal racial discrimination against white employees." Public and
private employees who claim that they are illegally harmed by the affirmative action
plan may attack the consent decree on the basis of their own Title VII rights to be free
from employment discrimination." Moreover, in the public sector, the rights of the
majority employees arising under the equal protection clause of the Constitution may
directly conflict with the operation of the voluntary affirmative action plans under Title
VII.' ,
Delineating the precise balance between the use of affirmative action to remove
often longstanding employment barriers against minorities, and the right of whites to
be free from excessive reverse discrimination, has proven a formidable judicial challenge.
The most difficult area in which to strike this balance is where white public employees
claim that an affirmative action plan, implemented pursuant to a Title VII consent
decree, violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Here courts must grapple
with the two distinct statutory and constitutional doctrines — doctrines which developed
independently and now collide. The task, then, is for the courts to reconcile their
interpretation of the constitutional requirements of a valid affirmative action plan with
the operation of the Title VII consent decree. If this reconciliation does not occur, the
alternative is to declare the voluntary settlement embodied in the consent decree con-
stitutionally unworkable, and to litigate every affirmative action plan.
Many courts have sought to avoid the issue, however, by precluding whites from
judicial challenge to consent decree affirmative action plans. Majority employees have
had difficulty either intervening in consent decree negotiations after they have begun,
or subsequently attacking the decree as reverse racial discrimination prohibited by either
Title VII or the equal protection clause of the Constitution." Many courts have reasoned
that the inclusion of majority employees in the negotiation process between minority
employees and the employer would frustrate the Title VII goal of voluntary settlement's
bring the original Title VII suit against their employer. "Majority employees" may make subsequent
efforts to intervene or challenge the result of the consent decree entered in the original suit to
preserve the employment rights affected by the decree. The term "majority employees" or "non-
minority employees" will describe the white persons or nonminorities adversely affected by the
affirmative action content of the decree.
9 See, e.g., City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 438; EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167,
173 (3d Cir. 1977).
10 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (white employee denied in-plant
training program for skilled job); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 882 (6th Cir. 1983) (one-
half promotions reserved for black police officers); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 67
(5th Cir. 1982) (one-half of all job vacancies reserved for blacks, subject to availability of qualified
applicants).
1 ' See Local Number 93 v. City of' Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
12 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
" See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
' 4 See, e.g., Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Ashley
v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983). See infra notes 93-165 and accompanying text for a
discussion of majority employees' efforts to intervene in or subsequently challenge affirmative action
consent decrees.
15 See, e.g., Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[T]he courts strongly favor
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These courts often exclude majority employees because the employees failed to seek
intervention at the outset of the negotiation process, and courts preclude later interven-
tion as untimely."' Courts also dismiss independent suits against consent decree affir-
mative action plans as impermissible collateral attacks on the decree. 17
 Consequently,
many courts have denied majority employees a forum in which they can challenge the
decree.
Other courts, however, have allowed majority employees to intervene and make
their arguments against the affirmative action plan. 18 If the employees receive intervenor
status, however, most courts do not then permit them to block the entry of the consent
decree. 19
 Only one court has refused to enter the consent decree because of the majority
employees' objections. That court determined that the decree compromised the majority
employees' contractual rights. 20
Two recent United States Supreme Court decisions represent the Court's latest
attempt to resolve the patchwork quality of lower court decisions in majority challenges
to voluntary affirmative action plans. In Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, the Supreme
Court noted with approval the district court's insistence that the the union representing
the majority employees intervene early in the formation of a consent decree. 21 The union
was able to participate in the negotiations, but was not permitted to block the ensuing
decree. 22
 The Supreme Court affirmed the consent decree over the union's objections,
holding that because a consent decree is not the equivalent of a court order under Title
VII, the Title VII requirement that a court make a judicial finding of discrimination
before it may order an affirmative action plan does not apply. 23
 Rather, the Court found
that consent decrees are to be treated as voluntary settlements for the purposes of Title
VII, and consequently that no finding of past discrimination is necessary."
resolution of suits such as this one by voluntary agreement, and there is a distinct probability that
the intervention of the unions will destroy the consent decree and force a trial on the merits.").
16
 E.g, Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 689. See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Thaggard decision.
" Id.
"'See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. 3063; see infra notes 116-127 and accompanying text for a
discussion of cases that permitted intervention by majority employees.
' See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. 3063; see infra notes 116-121 and accompanying text for
discussion of intervenor's limited rights.
2° City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 442. In City of Miami, the court noted that "[plum of the decree
do affect the third party who did not consent to it, and these parts cannot properly be included in
a valid consent decree." ld.
21
 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
22 1d. at 3066-71,
" Id. at 3071-72.
"Id. at 3071-73. The union's argument was based upon Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467
U.S. 561 (1984), where the Court held that a court could not order affirmative action absent an
adjudicated finding of discrimination. In Stotts, the district court had entered a Title VII consent
decree containing an affirmative action plan for promotion and hiring of minorities. Subsequently,
when layoffs became necessary, the court modified the consent decree to protect minority employees
with low seniority from being laid off. The Supreme Court in Stotts relied upon section 706(g) of
Title VII, codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-20005(g) (1982), which provides that "no order of the
court" concerning employment rights may be made for any reason other than discrimination, to
strike down the modification of the consent decree.
The Supreme Court distinguished Local Number 93 from Stow in that Local Number 93 involved
the entry of a consent decree negotiated by the parties, and not the court's order of the modification
of the terms of the consent decree at issue in Stotts. Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3072-73.
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The Supreme Court ruled the union's pleadings failed to raise the reverse discrim-
ination claims that the affirmative action plan violated the majority employees' equal
protection or substantive Tide VII rights." The Court left these issues to be raised
before the district court which maintained jurisdiction over the implementation of the
consent decree.26 Thus, although the Supreme Court implicitly approved the lower
court's finding that the majority employees had standing to challenge the consent decree,
the Court did not resolve the precise nature of their involvement in Title VII consent
decrees."
In contrast to the Title VII consent decree at issue in Local Number 93, Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education involved an equal protection challenge to an affirmative action
plan negotiated in a collective bargaining agreement between school teachers and a
municipality." The Court struck the affirmative action provision of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, concluding that the plan violated the equal protection rights of white
teachers who were laid off before minority teachers with less seniority." Although a
plurality of the Court found the plan unconstitutional, in dicta the Court suggested the
constitutional requirements necessary to establish a valid affirmative action plan."
Among these requirements the Court emphasized the need for "particularized findings
of past discrimination" by the public employer.'' Justice O'Connor pointed out in con-
currence, however, that if the requirement that public employers document their own
racial discrimination is applied restrictively, it might "severely undermine" the goal of
voluntary compliance with Title VII." Thus, although at least one Justice acknowledged
the tension between equal protection standards and Title VII standards, lower courts
were left with no indication of how to reconcile the two in challenges to affirmative
action plans.
Because affected majority employees have the due process right to claim that affir-
mative action plans violate their constitutional and Title VII rights, courts should not
resort to technical procedural barriers to protect consent decrees. Courts either should
permit them to intervene in the consent decree negotiation, or allow them to press their
claims in separate suits. Yet, granting traditional full party status to majority employees
might block the settlement of Title VII claims and force the trial on the merits that
Congress, the courts, and the other parties wished to avoid. Further, a separate suit by
majority employees on the issues of reverse discrimination also would frustrate the goals
of Title VII by promoting litigation rather than private settlement."
Thus, there are two levels of unresolved questions in the debate over public employer
consent decree affirmative action plans: first, how to include majority employees in the
consent decree process without destroying the voluntary, flexible and nonlitigious nature
of the decree; and second, when the reverse discrimination claims of majority employees
are addressed, how to reconcile the lack of findings of fact in the Title VII consent
25 Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3073 n.8, 3080.
26 1d. at 3073 n.8.
" Id.
25 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
29
 Id. at 1852.
,° Id. at 1848-49.
]1 Id. at 1848.
52 Id. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53 See City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 440.
•
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decree with the equal protection prohibition against affirmative action without a strong
evidentiary basis of past discrimination.
The resolution of these questions requires an expansion of the consent decree
process, and a less restrictive interpretation of the equal protection clause. Courts should
include majority employees on a limited basis, such that their claims can be heard and
addressed, without the need for full litigation. Specifically, courts should include majority
employees in a fairness hearing where they may raise objections and move for modifi-
cations but not block the settlement. And for such limited involvement to function,
courts must interpret the equal protection clause to permit affirmative action plans
adopted in this fashion, rather than requiring full adjudication of the employer's prior
discrimination."
This note will examine the procedural rights of majority employees to intervene in
voluntary affirmative action consent decree negotiations, and the ways in which courts
have resolved their substantive claims of reverse discrimination under both Title VII
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Section 1 will examine the use of
consent decrees under Title VII to effectuate the broad remedial purpose of the statute."
Section II will explore the independent requirements of a valid affirmative action plan
under the equal protection clause." Section Ill will discuss how courts have responded
when majority employees have claimed that affirmative action plans violate both Title
VII and the equal protection clause. 37 Finally, Section IV will offer a proposal for
reconciling the purposes of Title VII and the Constitution in voluntary affirmative action
through a formalized procedure of limited majority employee inclusion in the consent
decree negotiations." The note will conclude that the future efficacy of consent decree
affirmative action plans lies not in excluding whites from asserting that the plans are
unwarranted and illegal, but in interpreting the Constitution so that the rights of white
employees do not allow them to scuttle the voluntary efforts of public employers to
break down historical patterns of discrimination.
I. CONSENT DECREES UNDER TirLE VII
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to address
pervasive discrimination in the American workplace. 99 The statute prohibits employers
from making hiring, promotion, or any other personnel decision on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 40 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the
3' One commentator has advocated such an approach. See Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 887.
Professor Schwarzschild has proposed a fairness hearing during the consent decree process to
address the Title VII claims of majority employees. A similar procedure can also accommodate
majority employee claims that a Title VII affirmative action plan violates the equal protection clause.
See infra notes 328-50 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 39-165 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 166-232 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 233-88 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 289-352 and accompanying text.
39 1 10 CONG. REC. 7,220 (1964). Senator Clark told the Senate "[t]he rate of Negro unemploy-
ment has gone up consistently as compared with white unemployment for the past 15 years. This
is a social malaise and a social situation which we should not tolerate." Id., quoted in United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1978). •
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e•2(a) (1982). The statute provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
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primary goal of the statute is "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees."'"
While the overriding purpose of the statute is clear, Congress stated its prohibitions
in general terms. For example, the statutory language does not provide a definition of
discrimination, nor does it offer evidentiary guidelines in determining the burdens and
degrees of proof required to prove discrimination. 42 In addition, although Congress
specifically provided that courts may order the reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without backpay, Congress also authorized courts to provide any other equitable
relief they deem appropriate." By necessity, therefore, in the enforcement of Title VII
courts have been charged with the responsibility of developing evidentiary standards for
proving prohibited discrimination, and formulating remedies which may restructure the
way in which an employer hires, trains, promotes, assigns, and fires its staff."
Although courts have broad powers to fashion remedies under Title VII, Congress
specifically intended voluntary settlement to be the primary vehicle for enforcing Title
VII.45
 The procedural requirements of Title VII and the role established for the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) were designed to promote voluntary
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
	 •
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971).
" For example, 42 U.S.C. §,2000e-5(b) (1982) states only that the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) shall investigate charges of discrimination and determine if "there is a
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true." See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982) (definitions
do not include a definition of "discrimination").
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
44
	Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 890-91. One reason for judicial "activism" in the Title
VII area is the public law or "structural" nature of the Title VII suit. The very nature of Title VII
requires a great deal of judicial discretion and creativity in finding specific expression for the values
manifest in the Congressional mandate. Id. Such a court order affects not only the often large
institutional employer and the plaintiff class party to the suit, but classes of incumbent and future
employees as well. Id.
Professor Schwarzschild has argued that Title VII litigation is paradigmatic of large scale
"public law" or structural litigation because courts issue sweeping remedial injunctions that fun-
damentally reshape the personnel policies of employers. Id. at 887 (citing Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term — Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1,2 (1979)). These changes are not
designed to correct the employer's specific violations but to "create a new climate for employment
decisions in the future." Id. at 892. As such, Title VII remedies are only loosely related to the
violations cited in the suit. Schwarzschild argues that broad prospective remedies are a matter of
judicial discretion. Unlike a traditional civil remedy which "makes whole" specific victims, "no
particular policy choice for the future follows automatically from the employer's past violation of
Title VII," Id. at 893.
• " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). The statute states, "[t]he Commission shall endeavor to elim-
inate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, concil-
iation, and persuasion ...."
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settlement." To initiate a Title VII suit, a plaintiff must file a timely charge with the
EEOC." The EEOC then investigates the claim, and if it determines that there is a
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the statute requires the EEOC to
engage the employer in serious negotiations in the expectation of eliminating the vio-
lation through voluntary action. 48
Only after such efforts have failed may the EEOC bring a civil action against the
employer." The party who originally alleged the unlawful discrimination then may
intervene in that action. 3° Thus, Congress intended the EEOC to function primarily as
a mediator in the enforcement of Title VII. Only where determined efforts to forge a
voluntary settlement have failed may the government, or the alleged victims, pursue
litigation. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stressed that court-ordered remedies, par-
ticularly the award of backpay to victims, merely ensure the "prophylactic" aspect of the
goal of voluntary compliance. 5 I The Supreme Court reasoned that if employers were
made cognizant of potential liability for monetary damages to the victims of discrimi-
nation, they would find it to their advantage to eliminate their discrimination voluntar-
ily."
When employers seek to remedy prior discrimination independently, they often
include an affirmative action plan in the collective bargaining agreement with their
employees.53 These affirmative action provisions are negotiated by the parties to the
agreement, independent of any court involvement." When employers do not voluntarily
correct prohibited discrimination, however, employees or job applicants may find it
necessary to file a formal charge of unlawful discrimination with the EEOC 5 5 The EEOC
negotiations with the employer are often successful, and the terms of the resulting
settlement are usually formalized through incorporation into a consent decree. 56 Unlike
a collective bargaining agreement, a federal judge examines a proposed settlement and
decides whether to enter it as the decree of the court." Once entered, the court maintains
46 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979); Johnson v, Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 405 F.2d 645, 651 nn.12-15 (4th Cir. 1968).
47
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
41' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
49 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The Commission has 180 days to reach a conciliation agreement,
and Oriel may file a charge in,court and move for an additional 60 Hays for "further efforts of the
Commission to obtain voluntary compliance." Id, If the EEOC determines that a claim against a
public employer has merit and fails to negotiate a settlement during this period, it transfers the
claim to the Attorney General. Id.
5° Id. •If the Commission finds that the claim is meritless, however, the aggrieved party may
initiate a private suit on her own behalf as soon as she is so notified.
5L
 Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
52 Id. at 9 17-18. In Albermarle, the Court noted that:
It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award that "provide[s] the spur or
catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, [by voluntary action] so far as
possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's
history."
Id. (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
55
 See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 198.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56 See Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 894.
57
 Id.
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jurisdiction during the consent decree's implementation. 58 This jurisdiction includes the
power to interpret the proper implementation of the decree under changing circum-
stances, and to modify its terms altogether to preserve its central purpose.59
Although consent decrees are widely used, courts do not agree on the consent
decree's precise effect on future litigation among the employer, the minority group, and
the affected majority employees. 69 While consent decrees are founded on the agreement
of the parties, they are judgments in the sense that a court must approve them and a
court may enforce the decree through judicial sanctions, including citation for contempt
if the terms are violated. 61 In some cases decrees may have the force of res judicata and
protect the parties from future Iitigation. 62 In contrast, some courts have reasoned that
because the parties assent to its significant provisions, consent decrees are similar to
contracts and may be enforced in the same manner. 65 Thus, courts have found that
consent decrees contain qualities of both private contractual settlements and coercive
judicial orders.
The consent decree, however, is not a decision of the court on the merits; the court
makes no finding of fact in the usual sense." Yet the court does have some duty to
inquire into the propriety of the proposed decree. 65 The standards by which courts
examine proposed decrees have varied widely, however. Some courts "rubber stamp"
the proposal, particularly when the federal government is the negotiating party. 66 Other
courts focus on the fairness of the settlement, as in any proposed class action settlement,
and hold hearings to consider objections from class members.° Some courts also inquire
carefully into the proposed decree and hear the positions of various interested groups 68
68 See, e.g., Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. at 3080.
59 See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 553 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stous, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
6° See, Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 894-97.
61 United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1981); see 1B J. MOORE, J.
LUCAS & T. CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 9 0.409(51 (2d ed. 1984); James, Consent Judgments
as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1959).
u See James, supra note 61.
E.g., City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 440.
" Id. The court noted that the consent decree:
is not the equivalent to a judicial decision on the merits. It is not the result of a judicial
determination after the annealment of the adversary process and a judge's reflection
about the ultimate merits of conflicting claims .... Forged by the parties as a com-
promise between their views, it embodies primarily the results of negotiation rather
than adjudication.
Id.
° See Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 913.
66 In this situation courts have entered the decree the same day the complaint was filed. E.g.,
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975). The Court stated,
"nor should we substitute our notions of fairness ... for those of the parties absent a strong
showing ... ." Id.
67 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require court approval of class action settlements and
require that class members receive notice of the proposed settlement. FED. R. CD/. P. 23(e). Courts
may hold "fairness hearings" to consider objections to the decree by members of the plaintiff class.
Some courts have allowed nonminority employees to participate in such hearings. See Dennison v.
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 658 F.2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1981); Schwarzschild,
supra note 5, at 915.
68 In City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 441-42 (Rubin, J., concurring), the plurality asserted:
Because the consent decree does not merely validate a compromise but, by virtue of
its injunctive provisions, reaches into the future and has continuing effect ... the
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Employers often enter consent decree negotiations because minority plaintiffs or
the government identify a statistical imbalance in the workforce sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of Title VII discrimination. 6  Consent decrees under Title VII usually
require the employer not only to cease any current discriminatory practices, but also to
correct the statistical imbalance resulting from past discrimination. 79 To eliminate the
imbalance employers often adopt quotas to hire and promote minorities until the im-
balance is removed." Because this type of affirmative action also affects the employment
opportunities of majority workers, however, these workers may challenge the plan itself
as discriminatory under Title VII.
The Supreme Court first upheld the use of voluntary affirmative action quotas in
the 1979 landmark case of United Steelworkers a. Weber. 72 In Weber, a white employee
challenged on Title VII grounds a collective bargaining agreement which reserved 50%
of the openings in an in-plant craft training program for black employees." The agree-
ment specified that the affirmative action quota would reserve these openings until the
percentage of black craft workers was commensurate with that of the local labor force."
At the time the affirmative action plan was implemented in 1974, 1.83% of the skilled
craftworkers in the plant were black while the local workforce was approximately 39%
blac k."
The Court held that sections 703(a) and (d) of Title V11, 76 which prohibit racial
discrimination in employment, do not condemn all private, voluntary, race conscious
affirmative action plans. 77 The Court read the statutory language of section 703(j) 79 to
court should ... examine it carefully to ascertain not only that it is a fair settlement
but also that it does not put the court's sanction on and power behind a decree that
violates Constitution, statute, or jurisprudence.
Id. at 441 (Rubin, J., concurring).
69 See Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 899-900 (under Title VII statistics of disproportionate
minority representation in the workforce as compared to the relevant labor market are difficult to
rebut).
70 Id. at 894-98 (listing elements of typical consent decree).
7 ' See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 (collective bargaining agreement included plan to reserve
50% of openings in craft training program for black employees); Thaggard v. Jackson, 687 F.2d
66 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirmed consent decree with separate promotion and hiring lists for blacks and
whites to be used on one-to-one ratio until proportion equaled proportion of the city's population),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 900 (1983); Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 658
F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirmed consent decree providing 50% of all initial hiring and promotions
awarded to qualified minority applicants until list of identifiable past applicants depleted); Raker v.
City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Mich: 1979) (police department adopted affirmative action
program requiring separate black and white promotion lists with one-to-one ratio until ratio in all
three job levels were 50/50 and commensurate with population), aff'd sub nem. Rratton v. City of
Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
72 443 U.S. 193,204-06 (1979).
" Id. at 199.
74 Id.
" Id. at 198-99.
76 Title VI l's sections 703(a) and (d), codified at 42 U.S.C. §1 2000e-2(a), and (d), respectively,
provide that it is unlawful for an employer or a labor organization to discriminate in employment
practices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
77 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,208 (1979),
78 Section 703(j) provides that "nothing in this title":
shall be interpreted to require any employer
[orl labor organization to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
... group because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
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mean that Title VII cannot "require" any employer to grant preferential racial treatment
because of a racial imbalance in the work force, but section 703(j) does "permit" voluntary
affirmative action under Title VII to correct racial imbalances." The Court found Weber's
voluntary affirmative action plan within the permissible area of discretion left by Title
VII to the private employer."
Expanding on the statutory analysis, Justice Blackmun, concurring, stressed the
need for a zone of discretion for employers to implement voluntary plans to comply
with Title VII. 8 t He stated that if Title VII is read literally, employers are placed on a
"high tightrope without a net beneath them" 82 because they face liability for past dis-
crimination against minorities, and also liability to white employees for racial preferences
adopted to mitigate the effects of prior discrimination." Justice Blackmun's proposed
solution to this problem was to uphold voluntary affirmative action plans if the plans
are "a reasonable response to an 'arguable violation' of Title VII." 84
The Court declined to "define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible
and impermissible affirmative action plans." 88 Nonetheless, the Court outlined several
important factors in the analysis of a valid voluntary affirmative action plan. First, the
Court stated, the purpose of the plan must mirror that of the statute by breaking down
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. 86 The Court cautioned, however,
that such plans must be limited in their operation.67
 The plan should not "unnecessarily
trammel the interests of white employees," nor should it "create an absolute bar to the
advancement of white employees."88 Finally, the Court concluded, a valid plan should
operate as a temporary measure designed not to maintain racial balance, but to eliminate
a manifest racial imbalance."
In Weber the Supreme Court clarified the standard of review for direct attacks upon
remedial racial preferences included' in collective bargaining agreements. When the
affirmative action is embodied in Title VII consent decrees, however, courts have taken
a variety of approaches in determining the affected majority employee's right to chal-
lenge consent decrees. Some courts have precluded such challenges on various proce-
dural grounds,8° with one court openly concluding that consent decrees will not work if
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number
or percentages of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... .
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e•2(j) (1982).
79 Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-06. Majority employees in Weber argued that this provision prohibits
all racial preferences for those not found the actual victims of discrimination. Id.
BO Id. at 209.
8 ' Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
82
	 at 210 (Blackinuti, J., concurring) (quoting Weber v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Corp., 563
F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting)).
8' Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
84 1d. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
" Id. at 208.
86 See id.
" Id.
88 Id.
89 Id .
99 Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 67-68 (5th Cir. 1982) (majority employees not
permitted to intervene in original suit, subsequent collateral suit dismissed), cert. denied sub nom.
Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983); Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power, 658 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1981) (consent decree not subject to collateral attack); O'Burn
v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1976) 6ght to collaterally relitigate merits of decree denied
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majority challenges are permitted," Other courts have permitted limited and even full
intervenor status to objecting majority employees.g 2
The courts which have precluded majority employee challenges to consent decrees
have held both that majority employees could not intervene after the consent decree
had been negotiated, nor could these employees challenge the content of those decrees
in separate suits. In the 1976 case of O'Burn v. Shapp, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that the majority employees could not collaterally attack a
consent decree." In O'B urn, the challengers to the decree argued inter alia that they
should have standing to press their claims because they had not had "a meaningful
hearing."" The court found that the majority employees still had the opportunity to
seek intervention in the ongoing jurisdiction of the district court which had entered the
decree." Thus, the court reasoned, the separate suit constituted an impermissible col-
lateral attack upon the prior consent decree. 9° Further, the court noted that to allow
third persons an unqualified right to collaterally relitigate the merits of a judgment in a
prior suit would make it impossible for a court to enter a final judgment.'' The court
also stated that to allow the collateral suit might expose the parties to the consent decree
to inconsistent or contradictory proceedings."
Unlike the challengers in O'Burn, the plaintiffs in Prate v. Freedman attempted to
intervene before the court that had retained jurisdiction over the implementation of the
consent decree." Because the plaintiffs did not attempt to intervene until more than a
year after the entry of the decree, however, the district court ruled that their action was
since party could attempt intervention in original suit) aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977); Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (inter-
vention in original court one year after entry of decree denied as untimely; separate suit dismissed)
aff'd mem,, 573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978). In all of these cases
minority employees filed claims for wrongful discrimination under Title VII, the minority employ-
ees and the employer negotiated an agreement including an affirmative action quota, and the
settlement was entered as a consent decree. Subsequently, majority employees affected by the
affirmative action who were not party to the original suit filed separate actions alleging that the
employer, by fulfilling the requirements of the consent decree, violated Title VII and the Consti-
tution by engaging in reverse discrimination. These suits sought to stop the operation of the consent
decree through injunctive relief, money damages, or both. See Note, Collateral Attacks, supra note
7, at 147, 148-49 for an analysis of these cases.
" Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1980) (court denied unions' motion to
intervene, reasoning that "there is a distinct probability that the intervention of the unions will
destroy the consent decree and force a trial on the merits").
92 See Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 482 (6th Cir, 1985) (district court held "an
evidentiary hearing to consider the [intervenor's] objections") aff'd, Local Number 93 v. City of
Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711
F.2d 1117, 1124 (2d Cir. 1983) (district court held hearings to consider intervenor's objections);
City of Miami, 664 F.2d at 442 (Rubin, J., concurring) (intervenors permitted to block part of a
consent decree),
O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem., 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977).
O'Burn, 70 F.R.D. at 552.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 553.
97 Id. at 552.
95 Id.
" Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1295 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
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untimely.m° The majority applicants then sought injunctive relief in a separate suit.'°'
The district court hearing the independent complaint held that the plaintiffs should
have sought timely intervention in the original case, and determined that the subsequent
action constituted an impermissible collateral attack. 102
 The court also emphasized that
to permit further challenge to the consent decree would violate Title VII's policy to
promote settlement by rendering the concept of final judgments meaningless.'"
Similarly, in Thaggard v. City of Jackson, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the majority
employees had failed to seek timely intervention in the original suit, and could not bring
a collateral action. 104
 The court followed the "settled" rule that a consent decree is not
subject to collateral attack.'" In addition, the court relied on the reasoning of Prate that
courts must preserve Title VI I's emphasis on voluntary settlement.'m
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Thaggard was denied certiorari. 102 In dissent Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Brennan, challenged the reasoning of Thaggard and similar
cases on due process and res judicata grounds. log Justice Rehnquist argued that he was
"at a loss" to understand how the lower courts could preclude a suit. brought by parties
who had no connection with the prior litigation. 109 Justice Rehnquist pointed out that
the affirmative action plan was not implemented until a year after the court entered the
consent decree."" The plaintiffs attempted to intervene three years after the court
entered the decree, he continued, but their motions were denied as untimely."' Justice
Rehnquist argued that this violated a fundamental premise of preclusion law that non-
parties to a prior action are not bound by the judgment."" Rather, Justice Rehnquist
"' Prole, 430 F. Supp. at 1374.
LOI Id.
100 Id. at 1375.
I" Id. In another challenge to a consent decree, the majority employees attempted to distinguish
their claim by seeking compensatory rather than injunctive relief under Tide VII. In Dennison v.
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs' claim, holding that the plaintiffs could have timely intervened in the original
suit prior to the formation and entry of the decree, and that to subsequently attack the decree
would expose the employer to inconsistent obligations. Id. at 695.
Unlike most of the cases involving collateral attacks, the district court in Dennison permitted
the majority employee union to participate in "fairness hearings" before entering the decree. The
district court, and the Ninth Circuit on appeal, found that the fairness hearings held immediately
before the entry of the decree adequately afforded the union an opportunity to present to the
court its view of the adverse impact of the decree on the majority employees. Id. at 696. The court
also noted that permitting the collateral suit would be inimical to the policy underlying Title VII
of promoting settlements. Id.
104 Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, sub nom. Ashley v. City
of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 902 (1983).
10 1d. at 68.
1 " See id.
107 Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting From denial
of certiorari).
•100
	
464 at 901-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). One commentator
argues that in cases such as Thaggard, the parties in question may not have received timely notice
as required by the due process clause of the Constitution and as interpreted in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See Note, Collateral Altacks, supra note 7, at 154—
65.
1 °9 Ashley, 464 U.S. at 901-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
110 Id. at 902 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
"' Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
117 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Rehnquist noted that "Isluch
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argued, "everyone should have their own day in court."" 3 This principle, the Justice
continued, should apply with "all the more force" to a consent decree because it is not
an adjudication on the merits, but rather little more than a contract between the parties
formalized by a judge. 14 Justice Rehnquist concluded, therefore, that nonparties have
an independent right to an adjudication of their claim that a defendant's conduct,
whether pursuant to a consent decree or not, is unlawful." 3
In contrast to courts which have precluded claims of reverse discrimination by
majority employees, several courts have allowed at least some intervention by third
parties, particularly where it appears that the consent decree may compromise their
contractual rights." 6 For example, in Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional
Services, nonminority employees were granted limited intervention "solely for the pur-
pose of objecting to the proposed settlernent."" 7 The Kirkland court refused to permit
the intervenors to litigate the merits of the underlying discrimination claims against the
employer." 8 The employees were permitted to object only to provisions in the consent
decree that they claimed altered their contractual seniority rights. 139 The court con-
cluded, however, that no contractual rights were violated because the court determined
that nonminorities did not have a legally protected interest in the mere expectation of
a decree binds the signatories, but cannot be used as a shield against all future suits by nonparties
seeking to challenge conduct that may or may not be governed by the decree." Id. (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
" 3 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
"4 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
n' Some lower courts have supported the due process and res judicata principles articulated
by Justice Rehnquist. In United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1517-19, 1519 n.20
(11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit followed Justice Rehnquist's Ashley dissent on the issue of
whether majority employees could bring a subsequent suit. The court noted that res judicata
"prevent[s] the attack of a prior judgment by parties to the proceedings .... A final judgment may
not, however, bind a nonparty when his interests were not represented." Id at 1517-18.
Furthermore, in ,Corley v. Jackson Police Dep't, 755 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985), a Fifth
Circuit panel affirmed Thaggard in a related claim, but expressed sonic doubt about the principle.
The panel stated:
If the well-settled intervention rules in combination with the rule of Thaggard v. City
of Jackson, to which we arc firmly bound here, unjustly deny a party his day in court,
then the appropriate remedy lies in reexamination of the 7'haggard doctrine in the
appropriate forum, particularly in light of the persuasive opinion of Justice Rehnqu-
ist . . . .
Id. at 1210, quoted in, Note, Collateral Attacks, supra note 7, at 151 n.22.
JIG See, e.g., Youngblood v. Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986) (majority employees were
allowed to intervene only to challenge the affect of the consent decree on their promotions but not
on the merits of the dispute); Howard v. Mcl-ucas, 782 F.2d 956, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1986) (same);
EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 1977) (employee union was permitted
to intervene as the representative of majority employees because the decree could affect their
contractual rights but the union was granted standing solely to assert a "claimed inconsistency
between the decree and the promotional seniority provisions of their contracts").
In her concurrence in Firefighters Local 1789 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1989), Justice O'Connor
explicitly supported the view that intervention is required, at least if contractual benefits are at
issue. Justice O'Connor concluded that "if innocent employees are to be required to make any
[contractual] sacrifices in the final consent decree, they must be represented and have had full
participation rights in the negotiation process." Id. at 588 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117 711 F.2d 1117, 1125 (2d Cir. 1983).
118 Id.
IL' Id. at 1121, 1125.
1020	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:1007
appointments, particularly when that expectation was based on the operation of "pre-
sumptively discriminatory employment practices."'" Consequently, the Kirkland court
entered the consent decree over the majority employees' objections. 121
In contrast, a plurality of the Fifth Circuit found in United States v. City of Miami that
the union's contractual expectations had been violated and therefore permitted the union
to block the entry of some of the affirmative action provisions of the consent decree.' 22
In City of Miami, because the collective bargaining agent for the police officers union was
joined, as a co-defendant with the city in the original action by the Attorney General,
there was no subsequent dispute over intervention.'" Thereafter, the city and the At-
torney General reached a settlement that included explicit affirmative action promotion
quotas, and the district court entered the settlement as a consent decree.'"
In concurrence, one City of Miami judge noted that because the quota potentially
violated the police officers' collective bargaining agreement, that element of the decree
could not be entered without their consent.' 25 The concurring judge characterized the
three-party consent decree as a "hybrid decree," representing an agreement between
two of the three parties.'" The judge reasoned that insofar as the decree did not affect
the nonconsenting party it was valid, but because some parts did affect the third party's
contractual rights, these parts could not be included in a valid consent decree.' 27
Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland is the most recent case addressing the right of
affected third parties to challenge Title VII consent decrees.'" Local Number 93 involved
a Title VII consent decree negotiation between an association of black and hispanic
firefighters, called the Vanguards, and the city of Cleveland, Ohio.' 29 When the original
parties reached an agreement the district court held a two-day hearing to consider the
fairness of their proposed decree.'" The firefighters union, intervening on behalf of the
majority employees, participated in the hearing and objected both to the affirmative
action plan proposed in the agreement, and to the fact that the union had not been
included in the negotiations,'" The district court judge asked to approve the proposed
consent decree stated that he was "appalled that these negotiations leading to this consent
126 1d, at 1126 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 775-78 (1976)).
121 Kirkland v. N.Y. State Department of Correctional Services, 711 F.2d 1117, 1132 (2d Cir.
1983).
'" 664 F.2d 435 (en banc) (5th Cir. 1981).
' 25 Id. at 436 (Rubin, J., concurring).
124 Id. at 439 (Rubin, J., concurring).
125 See id. at 446-47 (Rubin, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 442 (Rubin, J., concurring).
' 27 1d. (Rubin, J., concurring). See also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757
(1983). In W.R. Grace & Co., the employer entered into a conciliation agreement with the EEOC
which required that it maintain the existing percentage of female employees in the event of layoffs,
contrary to the seniority-based layoffs required by the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 760.
When the employer adhered to the affirmative action plan, male employees brought an arbitration
action. Id. at 762-63. The court upheld the arbitration finding in favor of the male employees,
stating that the pro-settlement policy of Title VII did not permit the modification of a collective
bargaining agreement without a judicial determination. Id. at 771. See Note, Collateral Attacks, at
170-71, for full discussion of W.R. Grace & Co.
128
 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
'29 Id. at 3066.
'Sold. at 3068.
1" Id,
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decree did not include the intervenors."'" He deferred the proceeding and ordered the
city and the Vanguards to engage the union in discussion."s
The parties then negotiated a new proposal but it was defeated when submitted to
the union membership.'" Subsequently, the city and the Vanguards filed a second
proposed consent decree with the court."s Although the court heard the objections of
the union to the decree, it determined that the objections were insufficient to overcome
both the express admission of past discrimination by the city, and the statistical evidence
presented by the other parties.'" Specifically, the city and the minority plaintiffs had
stipulated that in 1980 the percentage of minority residents in Cleveland was 46.9% but
the percentage of minority firefighters holding the rank of Lieutenant or above was only
4.5%. 1 " The district court, therefore, entered the decree over the union's objections but
maintained jurisdiction over any subsequent claims or motions.'" The union appealed
the decision to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's ruling)"
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union claimed that section 706(g) of Title VII
precludes a court from approving Title VII relief which benefits individuals who are
not the actual victims of the employer's discrimination)* This claim was an expanded
reading of Firefighters v. Stotts,' 41 decided by the Supreme Court after the district court
entered the consent decree. In Stotts, the Court held that section 706(g) of Title VII
prevented a district court from ordering the modification of a consent decree to include
racially based lay-off protection) ." In Local Number 93, the union claimed that the term
"order" in section 706(g) also included the court's entry of a consent decree, and hence
that the affirmative action plan contained in the consent decree violated Title VII)*
The Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that whatever the limits of a court-
ordered affirmative action plan, a voluntary Title VII consent decree may exceed those
limits and include "reasonable race-conscious relief that benefits individuals not the actual
victims of discrimination."'"
Although the Court concluded that a consent decree can include affirmative action,
the Court recognized the union's right to present evidence and have its objections heard
at the consent decree hearings)* The Court, however, made no explicit reference to
the right of majority employees to intervene in the consent decree proceedings, nor did
the Court expressly reject the district court's decision to include the union as intervenors
'" Id.
132 Id,
1 " Id. at 3069.
" Id.
I" Id. at 3070.
I " Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 482 (6th Cir, 1985).
1 " Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3070.
"9 Vanguards, 753 F.2d at 479.
"0 See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3071.
141 467 U.S, 561 (1983).
142 Id. at 576-83. The Stotts Court struck down a court-ordered affirmative action layoff pro-
vision when it concluded that the district court's modification of a consent decree was covered by
§ 706(g), which prohibits court orders that require employment preferences for any reason other
than remedying discrimination. Id.
' 43 Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3071, 3073-74.
144 1d. at 3072.
'49
	 at 3079.
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of right.'" Thus, the Court apparently recognized that under some circumstances ma-
jority employees may intervene and raise claims against the proposed consent decree. 147
While the district court granted the union status as an intervenor of right, the union
ultimately could not block the affirmative action settlement. 148 Although the Supreme
Court noted that a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes obligations on a
party that did not consent to the decree,'" the Court held that the union could not block
the decree in this case because the decree did not bind the union "to do or not to do
anything." 150 The Court also reasoned that the consent decree did not purport to resolve
any claims the union might have under the fourteenth amendment or Title VII. 15 ' The
Court ruled that the plaintiffs must bring these claims to the district court "which has
retained jurisdiction to hear such challenges." 152
The Court reasoned that in entering the consent decree the district court did not
decide the union's underlying claims of impermissible reverse discrimination) 53 Instead,
the Court explained, the consent decree embodied the agreement of the parties, rather
than the force of the law upon which the complaint originally was based.'" Thus, the
Court continued, a third party intervenor could not block the ability of other parties to
settle their own disputes and withdraw from the litigation.'"
Justice Rehnquist dissented to the Court's opinion in Local Number 93. 156 He pri-
marily objected to the Court's finding that a consent decree is not an "order" within the
meaning of section 706(g). 157 The Justice argued that the decree "does bind" the City of
Cleveland to give preferential promotions to minority firefighters ahead of nonminority
union members who would have been promoted otherwise) 58 Justice Rehnquist would
hold, therefore, that the consent decree does create obligations upon the union in that
some of its members are "obviously injured." 159
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's reasoning that the third
party intervenor need not assent to enter a consent decree.' 60 Because the cases relied
148 Id. at 3066-73.
1 " See id. at 3079-80. Furthermore, by granting certiori, the Court implicitly recognized that
the union had standing to object to the decree.
148 Id, at 3079.
149 Id,
150 Id. at 3080.
151 Id.
152 1d.
' 53 Id.
154 Id. at 3076-77.
155 Id. at 3079 (riling Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392, 400 (1982); Kirkland
v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1126 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984)). The Court noted that in other legal contexts settling parties may not dispose of
the claims of a third party, and if properly raised these claims remain and may be litigated by the
intervenor. Id. at 3079.
156 Id. at 3082 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157 See id. at 3083-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). To support this conclusion Justice Rehnquist
addressed the issue of the consent decree's impact on the union's position. The Justice argued that
the obligations of the City of Cleveland under the decree and the union's claims were not as
disparate as the majority described. He called the finding that the decree does not bind the union
"pharisaical." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158 Id. at 3083 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 3084 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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upon by the majority involved permissive intervenors, rather than intervenors of right,
Justice Rehnquist noted, the cases did not support the majority's conclusion. 161 Permissive
intervenors, Justice Rehnquist stated, typically become parties only to ward off the
potential effects of stare decisis, whereas an intervenor of right becomes a party because
the disposition of the action may "as a practical matter impair or impede" its ability to
protect its interest. LOS Justice Rehnquist suggested that the majority's theory that. a court
may resolve a three-party dispute by entering a consent decree over the objection of an
intervenor of right was therefore a novel proposition." Justice Rehnquist argued that
only a judicial decree which draws upon the coercive power of the court could overcome
the objections of' an intervenor of right. 164 Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist would have
held that if the district court did not require the union's assent for the entry of the
consent decree, then such a decree is a coercive "order" within the meaning of Stotts and
section 706(g). 165
In sum, Congress designed Title V11 to redress employment discrimination through
broad institutional remedies voluntarily negotiated between the employer and the mi-
nority group. Often, however, these remedial programs substantially affect the employ-
ment positions and expectations of nonminority employees. Many courts have denied
these third parties the chance to challenge the affirmative action content of these agree-
ments. Although other courts have included nonminority parties in the negotiation stage
of the consent decree, as either permissive intervenors or intervenors of right, their
procedural right to litigate nonetheless remains unresolved.
EQUAL PROTECTION RESTRAINTS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
When private employers implement voluntary affirmative action plans through
consent decrees, they are subject only to the requirements of Title VII, Where the
employer is a public body, however, it must also adhere to the requirements of the
Constitution. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides an
additional set of guidelines for affirmative action plans adopted by a public employer,
as well as providing an independent ground for majority employees to claim that racial
preferences for minorities are unlawful.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment commands that no state
shall deny any person equal protection of the law." The Reconstruction Congress
1 " Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1 " Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist quoted from 1B J. Moorut , J. LUCAS, & T.
CURRIER, MOORE'S FEDERAL. PRACTICE 0.409[5] (2d ed. 1984): —But the fact remains that the
judgment is not an inter partes contract; the Court is not properly a recorder of contracts, but is an
organ of government constituted to make decisions and when it has rendered a consent judgment
it has made an adjudication.'"
Justice Rehnquist makes this argument primarily to dispute the majority's holding that the
term "order of the court" in § 706(g) does not apply to a consent decree. Local Number 93, 106 S.
Ct. at 3083, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). By his reasoning, therefore, the affirmative action plan at
issue is prohibited by § 706(g). Id. at 3085 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The idea that intervenors of
right cannot be precluded from fully litigating the affirmative action elements of consent decrees
follows implicitly. Id. at 3084 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
LOS The equal protection clause states, in pertinent part: "No state shall make or enforce any
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enacted the fourteenth amendment to grant by constitutional decree equal rights to
black persons.' 67 In the last forty years, however, courts have interpreted the clause to
prohibit all racial classifications which disadvantage members of minority groups.'" In
more recent years, "majority" groups, such as white males, also have used the equal
protection clause to strike down affirmative action plans which grant preferences to
minorities.'"
In applying the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has developed several
tiers of review depending on the group classified.'" Courts apply "strict scrutiny" to
government classifications which distinguish persons on the basis of "suspect" categories,
which generally include race and national origin. 17 ' Although the Court has most often
applied strict scrutiny to laws which discriminate against racial minorities,'" it has held
that strict scrutiny also operates against "racial ... distinctions of any sort," including
classifications discriminating against white persons.'" Strict scrutiny requires the govern-
ment to satisfy a two-prong test: first, the suspect classification must serve a compelling
state purpose; and second, it must use the least restrictive means to achieve that pur-
pose.' 24
When faced with the claims by majority groups that affirmative action plans designed
to remedy the effects of past unlawful discrimination are themselves violative of the
equal protection clause, the members of the Supreme Court have failed to agree upon
a consistent method of analysis.'" Nonetheless, there has been a degree of consensus on
the requirements of permissible affirmative action. A majority of the Court has confirmed
that a public body may voluntarily implement racial classifications which are intended to
remedy that body's previous racial discrimination, reasoning that the elimination of the
present effects of past discrimination is a sufficiently important governmental interest.'"
Generally, if the affirmative action plan seeks to remedy past discrimination the govern-
mental body first must make some evidentiary finding of that discrimination. The re-
law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fifth
amendment applies in an identical manner to the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
182 Seel MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1982).
168 See, e.g., Brown v, Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §1 14.8-14.9 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter NOWAK, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW].
169 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Court ordered plaintiff's
admission to medical school). These claims often are referred to as reverse discrimination claims.
' 7° See NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 168, at § 14.3. Suspect classifications such as
race receive strict scrutiny. Classifications based on sex are reviewed under an intermediate level of
scrutiny. Classifications which involve no protected group must be rationally related to a legitimate
legislative objective. See id.
121 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (national origin).
122 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6 (1978):
'" Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (opinion of Powell, j.).
124 See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); see also United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at § 14.3 ("This test is identical to that
employed in the post 1937 decisions on fundamental rights under the due process concept.").
122 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1979) (plurality opinion); See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265
(plurality opinion).
' 76 See Sheetmetal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1848-50 (dicta).
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medial affirmative action plan then established must be closely related to the purpose of
eliminating that discrimination.' 77
In developing the first part of the test, the Court considered in the school deseg-
regation cases what sort of findings of prior discrimination are necessary to serve as the
factual predicate of a valid remedial affirmative action plan. In the 1954 case of Brown
v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that a segregated school system was per se
discriminatory, and that its very existence supplied the evidentiary foundation that
justified the federal courts' use of racial classifications to achieve desegregation." The
Court later confirmed that the history of racial segregation empowered both the federal
courts and the school boards to adopt sweeping remedial racial plans)" Although the
Court did not require a fully adjudicated finding of fact concerning the discriminatory
harm in order to support remedial racial classifications as constitutionally permissible,
the Court nonetheless found that a clear history of pervasive discrimination made
evidentiary findings of discrimination unnecessary in school desegregation cases.'"
In seeking to eliminate less obvious forms of discrimination through affirmative
action plans, however, public bodies have encountered constitutional obstacles raised by
third parties. 18 ' Unlike school segregation, courts face a very different situation when
affirmative action is used either to remedy discrimination that is viewed as less clearly
the result of the public body's own actions, or as an effort to address a more generalized
"societal" problem.' 82
 Majority groups attacking affirmative action plans have alleged
that the employer has made insufficient findings of prior discrimination, or that the
plans are overly broad and unlawfully benefit minorities and disadvantage majorities
more than is necessary to achieve the stated end.' 8 ' Plaintiffs also have argued that any
racial preference granted to individuals not the adjudicated victims of unlawful discrim-
ination violates the equal protection clause.H"
The touchstone of constitutional analysis of affirmative action is the 1978 case of
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.'" In a plurality opinion, the Court found
a University of California medical school affirmative action plan unconstitutional, but
did not prohibit the use of racial classifications in the admissions process. 18" The medical
school opened in 1968, and in the next two years the faculty unilaterally devised a system
of racial quotas to increase the representation of "disadvantaged" students)" The plan
'" See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1852-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
''" 347 U.S. 483, 493, 495 (1954).
"" See, e.g., McDaniel v. Barressi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971). In McDaniel, the Court stated that
school boards which operate dual systems were "charged with the affirmative duty" to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated. Id. at 41 (quoting Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968)). The
"affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system" necessarily included the ability of the school
board to find that such a dual system exists. Id. After McDaniel it appeared that a school board's
determination that it muss institute a remedial racial plan because it is operating a segregated system
is not open to serious factual dispute.
18 " See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101
 E.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
182 Id. at 307.
165 id
184 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell support this position. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
530 n.12 (Powell, J„ dissenting).
1 " 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
tho id. at 271-72 .
I " Id, at 272-77,
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entailed a separate admissions program for minority applicants and set aside 16 spaces
of a class of 100 for minority students.'" Bakke was a white male who was rejected in
two successive years although his qualifications were higher than many of those accepted
in the separate minority program)"
In Bakke there was no issue of past discrimination by the university because the
medical school had never had a policy of excluding minorities. 19° The university claimed
instead that the plan served other compelling goals, including an effort to alleviate
societal discrimination, achieve classroom diversity, and increase the quality of healthcare
for minorities.' 91
 Bakke argued that none of these purposes justified the denial of his
admission because of his race.' 92
Unfortunately, the plurality opinion in Bakke did not provide clear guidance on the
standards of constitutional review for affirmative action plans. Instead, in a series of
opinions, various parts of the Court's holding emerged. In an opinion authored by
Justice Stevens, four justices expressed no view on the propriety of a remedial affirmative
action program, but found that the university's program violated Title VI.' 95
 In an
opinion written by Justice Brennan, four other justices would have sustained the program
as an appropriate response to general societal discrimination against minorities.' 94 justice
Powell wrote for the Court and borrowed parts of the other opinions in reaching his
own standard. He rejected the use of a remedial admissions program to respond to
general societal discrimination, but would have allowed the use of race as a factor in
admissions in order to achieve a diverse student body. 03
 Justice Powell concluded that
the program before the Court was invalid, however, because the rigid quota was more
restrictive than necessary.'" Accordingly, the Court found the plan unconstitutional and
ordered Bakke admitted to the medical schoo1. 192
Powell rejected the university's argument that the plan was necessary to remedy
"societal discrimination."'" Racial classifications seeking to remedy past discrimination,
the Justice asserted, must he linked to a more specific practice than that shown in this
case.' 99
 Justice Powell found that a classification that "aids persons perceived as members
of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals" is uncon-
IBB Id. at 274-75.
mg Id. at 276-78.
' 9" Id. at 305.
191
 Id. at 306.
192 Id. at 277-78.
' 9' Id. at 408. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination by institutions
receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 328. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun would permit
states to use race-conscious remedies "where there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a
product of past discrimination." Id. at 366. In response to Powell's two prong requirement that an
affirmative action plan serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest, these four Justices would require that benign racial classifications serve important govern-
mental objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Id. at 359. In
addition, the Justices would require an independent inquiry into whether the preference "stigma-
tizes any discrete group or individual and whether race is reasonably used in light of the program's
objectives." Id. at 373.
195 1d. at 314-15.
196 1d. at 315-19.
197 Id. at 320.
' 95 Id. at 307-10.
'99 1d.
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stitutional in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of prior
unlawful discri mina Lion . 2°°
Justice Powell also concluded that the Regents of the University, "as isolated seg-
ments of our vast governmental structures," were not competent to make findings and
decisions about the necessity of remedial racial plans not directly related to their own
previous discrimination, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislative
determined criteria." 2 ° 1 Thus, not only did the plurality agree that the university's
purpose in seeking to remedy societal discrimination was too broad to rise to the level
of a compelling state interest, but, under the circumstances, the university was not
competent to make such a finding. 2" 2
After Bakke, governmental bodies could unilaterally implement remedial affirmative
action plans only if they had made a valid finding of their own past discrimination. 2" A
valid finding requires identifying a sufficient level of discrimination by the governmental
body itself, and determining that the body is competent to make such a finding. 2" Bakke
Further established that nonminorities may have standing under the equal protection
clause to claim that an affirmative action plan does not satisfy these requirements. 2"
Many courts found that Bakke's fragmented decision failed to provide clear guidance
for resolving challenges to affirmative action plans. 206 Most recently, in Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education, the Supreme Court was again unable to agree on a consistent approach
to affirmative action. 207 In a plurality opinion Justice Powell garnered the votes of three
other Justices to support his view of a valid affirmative action plan. 208 Wygant involved a
collective bargaining agreement between the Jackson hoard of Education and the teach-
ers union which provided that if it became necessary to lay off teachers, those with the
most seniority would be retained, except that at no time would there be a greater
200 nid. at 307. The Court viewed the university's broad remedial purpose as the result of too
amorphous a concept of injury, for there was "no judicial determination °la constitutional violation
as a predicate for the formulation of a remedial classification." Id. at 301,
001 Id. at 309.
2°2
	 at 309-10.
2D3 See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846-47.
2" See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309-10.
205 Id,
2,6 See, e.g., United States v. City or Miami, 614 F,2(1 1322,1337 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane). After
attempting to discern the constitutional standard to be applied to affirmative action plans, the Fifth
Circuit noted, "[we] frankly admit that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke
opinions. In over 150 pages of United States Reports, the Justices have told us mainly that they
have agreed to disagree." Id.
Furthermore, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (f979), decided the following year, afforded
little additional clarity. In Fullilove, the Court faced the constitutionality of a congressional decision
to implement a ten percent set-aside in favor of minority contractors for public works contracts.
448 U.S. at 454. The decision of the Court by ChieflusticeBurger refused to link Fullilove to any
of the Bakke standards, finding only that Congress had the particular power under § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment to institute such a plan. Id. at 476-78.
The Sixth Circuit, quoting City of Miami as noted above, added, "[w]c do not believe that the
Court's subsequent decision in Fullilove has significantly clarified the Supreme Court's stance on
this issue." Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878,885 11.21 (6th Cir. 1983).
207 106 S. GI. 1842 (1986). The Court rendered a plurality opinion in which Chief' Justice
Burger and justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell.
MB Justice White concurred in the judgment but did not articulate any standard. Id. at 4487
(White, J., concurring).
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percentage of minority personnel laid off than the percentage of minorities working at
the time of the layoff.206 When layoffs became necessary the Board adhered to the
agreement and laid off nonminority teachers while minority teachers with less seniority
were retained."' Nonniinority teachers displaced through this process brought suit,
claiming that the affirmative action component of the collective bargaining agreement
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 "
Writing for the Court in a five to four decision, Justice Powell held that the plan
violated the equal protection clause. 2 ' 2 Because the school board had made no specific
findings of discrimination against minority teachers, but instead based its plan on the
need to remedy "societal discrimination" in part through classroom role models, the
state had no compelling remedial purpose to support the racial classification. 213 In
addition, the Court found that even in order to achieve a compelling state purpose, the
lay-off provision was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 2 ' 4 The Court concluded that the
affirmative action plan thus failed both parts of the test.216
In determining that the school board had not found a compelling purpose to support
its racial classification, Justice Powell emphasized the need for "particularized findings"
of past discrimination by the employer to support employment affirmative action. 216 The
Justice noted that the Court had never held societal discrimination alone sufficient to
justify a racial classification. 2 " Rather, Powell stated, the Court has insisted upon "some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit" involved before allowing
limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination.21 s Justice
Powell reasoned that such evidentiary support is crucial when the remedial program is
challenged in court by nonminority employees. 219
Although the school board argued before the Supreme Court that it had discrimi-
nated in its hiring practices, at the lower court levels the school board had asserted only
the more general remedial purpose of remedying "societal" discrimination 22° In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the lower courts had accepted this
purpose because they assumed that in the absence of specific, contemporaneous findings
of discrimination, the school board's affirmative action plan could only address societal
discrimination. 22 ' While Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's conclusion that
remedying societal discrimination was not a sufficiently compelling state interest, she
rejected the lower courts' assumption that specific findings were needed to find discrim-
266 id. at 1845.
21 ° Id.
2 " Id. Title VII was not at issue because the plaintiffs had not fulfilled its jurisdictional require-
ments. Id. at 1845-46.
212 1d. at 1852.
212 1d. at 1857,
214 Id. at 1847-48. The lower courts applied the test of reasonableness to the relation of the
means to the end, a test drawn from Justice Brennan's Bakke concurrence. Justice Powell found
"that standard has no support in the decisions of this Court."
215 Id. at 1848,1852.
216
 /d. at 1848,
217 Id. at 1847.
218 id.
219 1d. at 1848.
22° See Id. at 1847.
22 ' Id. at 1854 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ination more narrowly defined than merely "societal." 222 Instead, Justice O'Connor as-
serted that contemporaneous findings of actual discrimination were not necessary to
validate an affirmative action plan "as long as the public actor has a firm basis for
believing that remedial action is required." 223
Justice O'Connor based this evidentiary standard on her support of the goal of the
voluntary elimination of discrimination. 224 She cited the Court's and Congress's consistent
emphasis on voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the fourteenth amendment. 225
Imposing a contemporaneous findings requirement, Justice O'Connor argued, would
"produce the anomalous result" of permitting private employers to voluntarily correct
apparent violations of Title VII, as in Weber, while "public employers [would be] consti-
tutionally forbidden to ... correct their statutory and constitutional transgressions." 226
Although the majority also indicated that a specific and contemporaneous finding
of unlawful discrimination is not necessary for the correction of past discrimination to
rise to a compelling purpose, the majority did not state clearly what would constitute
the required "strong basis in evidence" to show past discrimination. 2" In her concur-
rence, Justice O'Connor suggested that the equal protection clause's evidentiary require-
ment should be more lenient in order to accommodate Title VII affirmative action
plans. 22g In her view, courts should follow the evidentiary standards delineated in Weber's
Title VII analysis.229 Thus, Justice O'Connor would find that evidence of discrimination
sufficient to support a prima facie case under Title VII also would create a "compelling
basis for a competent authority" to conclude that a voluntary affirmative action plan
serves a compelling state interest under the fourteenth amendment. 230 Nonminorities,
the Justice continued, then would have the opportunity to prove that the evidence is
insufficient to support an inference of prior discrimination, or that the plan instituted
on the basis of this evidence was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 231 It is the nonminority
plaintiffs, the Justice explained, who bear the burden of proving the inadequacy of the
employer's asserted evidence." 2
In sum, a valid affirmative action plan under the equal protection clause must survive
the two-pronged strict scrutiny test as delineated by Justice Powell in Bakke and Wygant.
First, the plan must be proposed pursuant to a compelling governmental purpose. For
a voluntary racial plan, the governmental body must show both a compelling purpose
and competency to make that determination. Second, the plan must be narrowly tailored,
or the least restrictive possible means to achieve the compelling interest. Individuals
adversely affected by voluntary affirmative action have had some success in challenging
such plans on the grounds that they violate this test.
222 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
223 Id. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
224 See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
225 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
226 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
221 Id. at 1849.
228 Id. at 1855 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2s8 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor suggested that, as in Title VII cases,
statistical evidence of disparity between minority employees and qualified minorities in the area will
be sufficient to state a prima facie case, and will be difficult to refute. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2" Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
232 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE VII AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS
A challenger to a public employer's voluntary affirmative action plan may raise
claims under both Title VII and the equal protection clause."' Yet courts have rarely
had occasion to compare directly the operation of the statutory and constitutional laws,
and the Supreme Court has explicitly avoided such a comparison. 234 The Court has
chosen, thus far, to keep the two analyses distinct.233
The district and appellate courts of the Sixth Circuit were among the first to address
the issue of the relationship between Title VII and equal protection claims involving
voluntary affirmative action plans. In 1974 the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners
determined that the police department had and was continuing to engage in racial
discrimination. 239 Unilaterally, and without a Title VII consent decree, the department
ordered wide ranging affirmative action,237 including a "goal" of one-for-one hiring and
promotion of whites and nonwhites in the department. 238 After several years, this plan
resulted in the promotion of non-white police officers ranked lower on the promotion
list before or instead of white police officers ranked higher on the list. 239 This, in turn,
led to a flood of litigation when white police employees challenged the affirmative action
plan on both Title VII and equal protection grounds."°
In 1975, white police sergeants passed over for promotion brought suit to challenge
the affirmative action plan. 24 ' The district court in Baker v. City of Detroit concluded that
it should review voluntary affirmative action plans implemented by public employers
solely under the standards of 'Title VI I. 242 If found valid under the test articulated in
2" See, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 881 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1040 (1984).
'" See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3073 (Court noted the issue but declined to resolve it). As
the Sixth Circuit noted, the Bakke equal protection case was not cited as authority for the ultimate
resolution of the Title VII issues in the Weber case, and the Court did not later rely on Weber when
it returned to the constitutional bounds of permissible affirmative action in Fullilove. Bratton, 704
F.2d at 884 n.19.
235 But see Sheetmetal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). In Sheetmetal Workers, the
Supreme Court reviewed an affirmative action plan ordered by the district court after the court
found the union guilty of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII after a trial on the merits.
Because the court could order only such relief that also was within the bounds of the Constitution,
the appellate and Supreme Court reviewed the legality of the affirmative action ordered by the
district court under both Title VII and the Constitution. Id. As Stotts and Local Number 93 recognized,
however, the standards under Title VII are different if the affirmative action is voluntary as
compared with court-ordered. The Supreme Court has not addressed the relationship between
Title VII and the equal protection clause in the context of voluntary affirmative action plans. See
Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3074-75; Stotts, 467 U.S. at 583. In Sheetmetal Workers, the Supreme
Court held that there was sufficient evidence for the factfinder to have ordered affirmative action
relief under both Title VII and under the most rigorous equal protection test. Sheetntetal Workers,
106 S. Ct. at 3054.
236 Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 681 (fith Cir. 1979).
237 Bratton, 704 F.2d at 882-83.
238 Id. at 882. The department contained three primary ranks: patrolman, sergeant, and lieu-
tenant, and for several years promotions from one rank to the next were made on the basis of the
one-for-one goal. Detroit Police Officers, 608 F.2d at 681.
239
 Brawn, 704 F.2d at 882.
240 Bratton was the consolidation of several district court actions. Id. at 879.
241
 Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 919, 937 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
242 id. at 930, 991.
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the Title VII Weber case, the court concluded that the plan also "should pass muster
under the Constitution." 2" The Baker court reasoned that because the Supreme Court
has stressed the need for voluntary efforts to eliminate past discrimination, courts should
apply the constitutional analysis of voluntary plans coextensively with the standards of
Title VII.244
The same evidentiary factors of racial imbalance and traditionally segregated job
categories that the Supreme Court identified in Weber, the Baker court stated, provide a
sound basis for constitutional analysis. 245 The court recommended that a finding by a
public employer that racial imbalance exists in a traditionally segregated job category,
for the purpose of Title VII, should be equated with a finding that the employer had
failed in its equal protection duty to remedy the present effects of past discrimination. 246
Thus, the court continued, the employer's implicit or explicit finding of past discrimi-
nation would have the same directness and reliability as that required by Justice Powell's
equal protection standard applied in Bakke. 247 The Baker court thus approved the police
department's voluntary plan as an appropriate response to the department's prior dis-
crimination. 218
The Baker court further reasoned that equal protection challenges to affirmative
action should follow Title VII analysis because public employers require a measure of
discretion to formulate remedial plans.24" The court reasoned that if the constitutional
limitations on affirmative action were too restrictive, this would make it. difficult for a
public employer to pursue the remedial action required by Title VII. 2" The public
employer would face a dilemma: the "risk of suit by one side or the other no matter
what it does." 25 ' In other words, the court explained, under a restrictive construction of
the equal protection clause, an employer who took no action to correct the present effects
of past or present discrimination might violate Title VII, yet affirmative action could
result in liability to affected nonminorities under the equal protection clause. 252 The
court rejected this constitutional interpretation, noting that private employers faced the
same dilemma before Weber, and that the Supreme Court had upheld private sector
affirmative action in part to alleviate the problem. 253 The same area of reasonable
discretion in the voluntary implementation of remedial plans approved in Weber, the
court found should apply to a public employer's decision to remedy what it reasonably
believed to be past discrimination on its part. 254
245
 Id.
244 Id.; see also NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965,975-78 (1st Cir. 1982) (In simultaneous Title
VII and equal protection claims, court applied the Weber standard foremost among others).
245 See Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 990-91.
244 1d. at 991.
497 Id. In reference to Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, the court quoted the factors of "'disabling
effects of identified discrimination,' and 'judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of consti-
tutional ur statutory violations,' which in his eyes would justify a preference." Id. (quoting Bakke,
438 U.S. at 307).
245 Id. at 1003.
245 1d. at 991.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 See id,	 •
235
	
See also Weber, 443 U.S. at 210-1 k (Blackmun, J., concurring).
254 Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 991. Although the district court ventured the proposition that Weber's
Title VII standard should apply equally to the public sector, it realized that its views might not be
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The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's holding in
favor of the affirmative action plan in Bratton v. City of Detroit. 255 The appellate court,
hOwever, did not accept the lower court's reading of the relationship between Title VII
and the equal protection clause. 256
 The Sixth Circuit noted that when the Supreme Court
decided Weber, the Court gave no indication that had the plan before it been "subject to
the strictures of the fourteenth amendment, the test of permissibility would have been
the same."257 Thus, the Bratton court declined to accept the Weber standard as determi-
native of the constitutional question. 258
Yet, after concluding that it was obligated to pursue a separate constitutional analysis
of the affirmative action plan, the Bratton court openly acknowledged that the Supreme
Court's decisions left it unsure what analysis to employ. 259 The court adopted Justice
Brennan's approach in Bakke, with the addition of Justice Powell's requirement that a
competent body make findings of discrimination. 260 Applying this standard to the case,
the13ratton court found that the police department's prior egregious racial discrimination
fully satisfied the constitutional requirements necessary to justify affirmative action. 261
The court also indicated its belief that the case warranted the affirmative action regardless
of the precise semantics of the constitutional test. 262
The Detroit police cases indicate the difficulty courts have had in differentiating
and applying Title VII and the equal protection clause to affirmative action plans.
Moreover, in these cases the plans were completely self-enacted by the employer. Where
the affirmative action plan is negotiated pursuant to a Title VII consent decree, however,
the role of the constitutional challenge in the proceedings is further complicated both
by the inability of many majority employees to intervene in the proceedings, and when
allowed to intervene, the uncertainty of the extent to which they may attack the merits
of the affirmative action. 263
For example, in Culbreath v. Dukakis, 264 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reviewed the district court's refusal to allow the union's intervention more than four
years after consent decree negotiations had begun. The union sought to bring both Title
VII and equal protection challenges to the affirmative action plan. The court of appeals
noted that denying intervention would forever foreclose the union from challenging the
consent decree. 265 The court of appeals further stated that the union could not collat.-
accepted. Id. at 990-91. Hence, it held that whatever standard ultimately is applied, "the sad history
of the Detroit Police department" is adequate to sustain some form of affirmative action. Id.
255 704 F.2d at 878.
255 Id. at 884-85.
257
	 at 884.
255 Id. The court observed, "kitten we cease analyzing the actions of a public employer qua
employer and begin to examine the validity of those actions as state action, a constitutional inquiry
is appropriate." Id.
255 Id at 885 & n.21.
255 Id. at 885-86, 886 n.29. Although the court distinguished the Constitution and Title VII,
it combined them in performing its analysis, finding that because the equal protection standard was
more rigorous, a plan found permissible under the Constitution would pass Title VII muster as
well. Id. at 887.
251 Id. at 887 n.32.
252 Id. at 884-85, 884 n.20.
2" See, e.g., Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
2"4
 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980).
See id. at 22.
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erally attack the decree because the same court which denied intervention retained
jurisdiction over the decree, and res juciicata principles would ban a second challenge in
that court.266 Thus, the court of appeals recognized the difficulties faced by affected
third parties in their challenge to consent decrees. 267
Despite these concerns, the Culbreath court refused to allow the union to intervene.2"8
The court emphasized that the union had not suffered significant prejudice from its
absence from the consent decree proceedings. 269 The court further found that regardless
of whether the unions had intervened and pressed their equal protection and constitu-
tional claims, the plaintiffs still were likely to have prevailed on the merits. 2" The court
noted that the potential intervenors did not dispute the statistical evidence of racial
discrimination in the defendant's employment and promotion practices. 27 ' Thits, the
Culbreath court prohibited intervention partly because the challengers were not likely to
defeat the plan. 222
Similarly, the court in Vanguards v. City of Cleveland never explicitly addressed the
merits of the nonminority reverse discrimination claims. 273 The court did, however, lay
out the factors which it considered should comprise a district court's analysis of a Title
VII consent decree, a formulation which brought together both equal protection and
Title VII analyses. 274 The court stated that when presented with a proposed consent
decree, a district court must determine only whether the settlement is fair, adequate,
and reasonable. 225 Citing the Sixth Circuit's equal protection analysis in Bratton, the
Vanguards court stated that in making this determination the district court should con-
sider whether the affirmative action plan is reasonably related to the objective of rem-
edying prior discrimination, and whether the plan is fair and reasonable to the affected
nonminoritieS.276 The court then listed several factors, drawn from Weber's Title VII
analysis, that would determine whether the plan impermissibly burdened nonminbri-
ties. 2" Thus, without clearly distinguishing equal protection and Title VII, the Vanguards
court merely noted that because the plan fell within the limits set by Weber and those set
in cases such as Bratton, where the equal protection clause applied, the consent decree
did not violate the nonminorities' legal rights.")
More recently, the Sixth Circuit court of appeals appears to have abandoned its
conclusion Bratton that a public employer's affirmative action plan is subject to separate
Title VII and constitutional analysis. In Youngblood v. Dalzell, the court affirmed the
entry of a consent decree ordering affirmative action in the Cincinnati, Ohio fire de-
266 Id.
267 Id.
7" Id. at 25.
2"" Id. at 23.
2711 Id.
271 Id.
272 See id.
273 Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom., Local Number
93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
274 Id. at 484,
275 ird.
276 Id. (citing Brillion, 753 F.2d at 887).
277 See id.
27° Id. at 489 n,10. The Supreme Court did not address this issue in its review of the case. Local
Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3072, 3073 n.8.
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partment. 228 The district court permitted the firefighter's union to intervene in the
negotiation of the decree, and the union appealed the ultimate decree charging that it
violated the equal protection clause. 280 Rather than apply a separate test under Title VII
and the equal protection clause, which seemed to be the approach suggested in Bratton,
the appeals court relied entirely on the Title VII standards articulated in Weber. 281
 The
court noted that in Local Number 93 the Supreme Court had not reached the issue of
whether the equal protection clause requires additional or different analysis than Title
V11. 282
 In the absence of guidance on this issue, the court determined that it would apply
only the Title VII Weber test to the constitutional challenge. 283
The few courts that have attempted to sort out the difference between the require-
ments of a valid affirmative action plan under Title VII and the Constitution have been
unable to formulate clear standards. While courts have rejected the claim that Title VII
must be construed coextensively with the fourteenth amendment, 284 most courts also
have not accepted the approach that subsumes the equal protection analysis entirely
under the standards of Title VII. 286 According to some courts, if the majority employees
properly raise both grounds for challenging affirmative action, courts must pursue the
two separate lines of analysis. 286 As the Bratlon court acknowledges, however, what
constitutional analysis courts should employ remains unclear. 287
Consequently, many courts avoid the question through the procedural step of deny-
ing majority employees a forum to make either of the two claims. 288 If the affirmative
action plan is implemented pursuant to a Title VII consent decree, courts often deny
the majority employees' motion to intervene as untimely, and dismiss subsequent efforts
to challenge the consent decree as impermissible collateral attacks. Courts thereby escape
the necessity of determining the precise relationship between Title VII remedies and
equal protection restrictions.
IV. RECONCILING EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS WITH TI'rLE VII CONSENT DECREES IN
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In framing Title VII to eliminate employment discrimination, Congress sought to
avoid some of the controversy and resentment affirmative action might cause by making
279
 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986).
2" Id. at 362-63.
281
 Id. at 365.
282 Id.
2A1 Id.
284 E . -.,g Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1979); Detroit Police Officers'
Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 689 n.7 (6th Cir. 1979); Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F.Supp. 930,
986 n.106 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd sub nom., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). Plaintiffs in these cases argued that because the congressional
power to extend Title VII to the states derived from the fourteenth amendment, rather than the
commerce clause, Title VII as applied to the states must be coextensive with the fourteenth
amendment. The courts cited above rejected this argument. The Scott court stated "whether the
employer be private or public, the same prerequisites to Title VII liability apply ...." 597 F.2d at
900. The Detroit Police Officers court similarly held that "reliance on the fourteenth amendment as
the source of legislative power for the 1972 amendments does not limit their substance to the
minimum protections provided by the fourteenth amendment." 608 F.2d at 689 n.7 (citing Katz-
enbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
28'
	 e.g., Bratton, 704 F.2d at 884.
2811 Id. at 884-85.
257 Id.
288 See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
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voluntary agreements the preferred method of compliance. 289 When courts limit their
understanding of who is to participate in the voluntary agreement to minority plaintiffs
and their employers, however, the judicial emphasis on conciliation abrogates the due
process rights of nonminority workers who make the employment sacrifices for affir-
mative action. With the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have
not developed a clear procedure by which nonminority employees may intervene to raise
their claims. Furthermore, when majority employees are included, courts have not agreed
on how to preserve the voluntary consent decree when faced with the attempts of' the
intervenors to litigate the substantive Title VII and constitutional issues.
While the Supreme Court acknowledged a possible conflict between Title VII and
equal protection in Local Number 93, it declined to involve itself in its resolution. The
resulting lack of guidance for lower courts, and more importantly for public employers,
threatens the goal of the voluntary eradication of racial discrimination underlying both
Title VII and the equal protection clause. Public employers may hesitate to enter into
consent decree negotiations without knowing the extent to which the decree will include
majority employees. Public employers may perceive the tortuous path of a negotiated
settlement under these conditions as holding no advantages over litigation.
This section of the note will examine the extent to which nonminority employees
may intervene and raise constitutional challenges to affirmative action plans established
by Title VII consent decrees. Section A will review the right to intervene and will suggest
that courts permit limited intervention in order to allow majority employees to voice
their objections to the proposed remedies. Section IS will consider the extent to which
courts should allow intervenors to raise equal protection claims, and how such consti-
tutional challenges can be accommodated within the Title VII statutory structure. The
note will conclude that Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Wygant provides the guidance
to reconcile both constitutional and Title VII claims.
A. Third Party Intervention in Consent Decree Negotiations
The ability of majority employees affected by an affirmative action plan to intervene
in the consent decree proceedings remains unclear. Although the Supreme Court had
the opportunity in Local Number 93 to address the scope of majority employees' right to
intervene in Title VII consent decree negotiations, the Court limited its holding to the
technical issue of the meaning of Title VIPs section 706(g) in relation to consent de-
crees. 23° Yet the Court's language appears to support the district court's decision to allow
limited inclusion of the majority employees iti the consent decree negotiations. 2•" The
Court stated that an intervenor was entitled to present evidence and have its objections
heard at the consent decree hearings, but the intervenor does not have the power to
block the decrees merely by withholding its consent to the plan. 2`'2 rl'hus, the Court
apparently agreed with the district court's insistence that the union have the opportunity
to participate in the consent decree proceedings.
The district court's decision to permit the intervention of the Local Number 93
union, however, may not be a recognition that majority employees have a right to be
included in the consent decree negotiations. Instead, it merely may be consistent with
2
"9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
29" See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3070-71.
211 Id. at 3078-79.
292 Id,
1036	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:1007
the Thaggard reasoning which protects consent decrees from collateral attack. In Thaggard
and related cases, the majority employees' motions to intervene were denied as un-
. timely. 293 In Local Number 93 the majority employees simply realized their interests in
time, and were permitted to intervene as a matter of right. 294 Thus, Local Number 93
may merely demonstrate that upon timely filing majority employees may intervene in
consent decree proceedings: 293
Courts should not interpret Local Number 93 in this manner. Rather, courts should
recognize that the majority employees have a right to be included in the negotiation of
consent decrees that may affect their employment rights. As justice Rehnquist pointed
out, majority employees should not be denied the right to raise their objections on res
judicata grounds when they never had their day in court. 296 Once third parties are
granted the right to intervene and participate in the formation and approval of the
decree, it may be appropriate to hold that the agreement is res judicata against them,
even if they. do not ultimately sign the decree, 297 Thus, courts should allow the interven-
ors to seek redress of their objections through appeal of the district court's entry of the
consent decree.
If courts include the majority employees in the original consent decree proceeding,
their intervention raises at least two possible issues: the extent to which the intervenors
may force litigation on the merits by refusing to sign the consent decree, and the extent
to which potential equal protection claims may alter the Title Vii proceeding. Although
the majority employees' participation in Local Number 93 seemed to raise these questions,
the Supreme Court found that the intervening union which represented the majority
em ployees had not properly raised the equal protection claim below. 293
 The Court
therefore declined to resolve the constitutional issue and left the claim to be raised in
the district court. 2"
There are various methods by which courts can resolve these issues and include
majority employees in the consent decree negotiations. For example, courts could permit
intervenors to block the entry of consent decrees and to litigate fully the merits of the
discrimination claims against the eniployer. 30° Courts could grant majority employees
the opportunity to prove that affirmative action is unwarranted on the facts of the case,
2" See supra notes 104-115 and accompanying text. In Thaggard, the majority employees'
collateral attack on the consent decree was prohibited, even though they had attempted and failed
to intervene. 687 F',2d 66,67 (5th Cir. 1982). Thus, the majority employees had no opportunity to
be heard in regard to the plan.
2t4
	 Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3066.
295 Id. at 3066-67.
Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900,901-02 (1983) (Rehnquist, J„ dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
2" Cf. id. at 902 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
2" Local Number 93,106 S. Ct. at 3070-71.
29" The pleadings by the union suggest, however, that they thought they had included an equal
protection challenge to the decree as well as the claim based on the restrictive interpretation of
706g of Title VII. Brief for the Petitioner, at 11, Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.
Ct. 3063 (1986). Yet the Court determined that under the procedural posture of the case, "we have
no occasion to address the circumstances, if any, in which voluntary action by a public employer
that is permissible under § 703 (of Title VII] would nonetheless be barred by the fourteenth
amendment." Local Number 93,106 S. Ct. at 3073 ri.8.
3°° Justice Rehnquist appears to take this position. See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3083
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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or allow them to seek to limit race-conscious relief to individual victims only."' This
approach would make it extremely difficult for employers to settle discrimination claims.
The complete vindication of the majority employees' interests in such a manner could
come only at the cost of turning the consent decree proceeding into a traditional litigation
on the merits.
It is unlikely, however, that courts will allow intervenors to litigate the merits of the
claims and block the consent decree in light of the Supreme Court's approval, in Local
Number 93, of the district court's entry of the consent decree over the objections of the
intervening union, and the district court's limitation on the union's right to litigate the
issues." Furthermore, permitting intervenors a limited right to challenge is appropriate.
The right of the intervenors to litigate the underlying issues would jeopardize the
considerable advantages consent decree settlements offer the parties, as well as under-
mine Congress's intent to encourage voluntary settlement of Title VII claims."
For the minority plaintiffs, the consent decree is a relatively fast and less costly
method of redressing discrimination." Although an individual plaintiff may lose poten-
tial backpay damages available under Title VII, this loss is often offset by the speed and
certainty of the consent decree action as compared with full litigation." The consent
decree also generates employer compliance more readily than if the same changes are
bitterly disputed and ultimately ordered by a judge."
From the employer's standpoint as well, the consent decree offers numerous advan-
tages. Foremost among these is that through voluntary settlement the employer escapes
the potentially enormous cost of' litigation."' In addition, the employer can limit or
eliminate liability for backpay damages. The employer can bargain for prospective
minority promotion and hiring quotas in exchange for release from potential financial
remedies to actual victims. Furthermore, the employer is in a position to control to a
significant degree the shape of the final remedial plan. While the employer must corn-
" During the Reagan Administration the Attorney General's office attempted to enforce this
theory by sending a letter, under the signature of Assistant Attorney General William Bradford
Reynolds, to 47 cities and states asking them to discard the affirmative action components of consent
decrees and judicial orders currently in effect. Washington Post, March 1, 1985, at A3,
31 ' 2 See Youngblood v. Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986). In Youngblood, the Sixth Circuit
interpreted Local Number 93' to support the practice of limited majority employee intervention in
Title VII consent decrees. Citing Local Number 93, the court stated that an intervenor is entitled to
have its interests considered in the negotiation process but may not block the entry of the decree
by withholding its approval. Id. at 364.
Indeed, if courts construe the equal protection clause to require the evidentiary determination
of individual victims before an employer or a court may award any race conscious relief, public
employers either would have to admit their prior discrimination and present evidence of particular
victims in any settlement, or simply enter litigation. The potential liability for backpay to any
identified victim of discrimination makes settlement on such terms unlikely. By contrast, private
employers would continue to enjoy the prerogatives of consent decree settlements because they are
not subject to the requirements of the equal protection clause.
" See Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 898-900, for a general discussion of the advantages of
consent decrees.
sua Id.
305 Id .
3°" See United States v. City of Miami, 664 -FlEf 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1981).
" See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 851 n.28 (5th Cir. 1975) (in
the absence of a consent decree settlement, the extremely complex litigation could have taken 28
years).
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promise, it is free to mold the relief to best eliminate the unlawful discrimination and
its effects while maintaining the institutional structures most important to the functioning
of the workplace. 3°8
Finally, an employer may wish to avoid a courtroom confrontation and minimize
the public stigma attached to a charge of racial discrimination. A private corporation or
public employer may prefer to settle in order to avoid the negative publicity that de-
fending such a charge will entail. This motivating factor is especially important where a
municipal employer faces high racial tensions, and a trial over the issues of the history
and fault of racial discrimination would inflame an already divided citizenry. 369
Consent decrees, therefore, offer considerable advantages to employers and minor-
ity employees. Yet the efforts of majority employees to challenge their constitutional
validity threatens their use. Clearly courts must develop some standard to govern the
participation of adverse nonminority parties in the consent decree settlement process
without allowing them to block the decrees. Professor Maimon Schwarzschild has pro-
posed a formal policy of limited intervention for majority employees in Title VII consent
decree proceedings. 3 ") In Professor Schwarzschild's view, courts should avoid the out-
come of City of Miami, where the majority employees were permitted to block the entry
of part of the decree. He proposes, rather, that the court should permit the majority
employees to intervene solely for the purpose of objecting to the remedy established by
the consent decree. The intervenor would not be permitted to argue whether the
employer's alleged discriminatory violation supports the remedy. 3" Professor
Schwarzschild bases his limited intervention proposal on the assertion that the majority
employees' due process rights include the right to be heard and make objections and
suggestions in regard to the decree. But these rights do not include the right to force
the court to make findings of fact or conclusions of law on the underlying merits of the
minority plaintiff's case. 312 Under his approach, courts would only consider the majority
employees' objections to the proposed remedy, and refuse to permit the focus of the
proceedings to turn to issues concerning the alleged violation.?' 3
30" See generally Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 898-901,909-10.
309
 The Detroit Board of Police Commissioners instituted its unilateral affirmative action plan
largely to ease racial violence and tension in the community. See Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v.
Young, 608 F.2d 671,680 (6th Cir. 1979). The Jackson School Board similarly sought to ease racial
violence in the schools through an affirmative action plan implemented in the collective bargaining
agreement with the teachers. See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1859 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
310
 Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 923.
31 1
 See Kirkland, 552 F. Supp, 667, 668 (1982).
512 Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 923.
313 Id, Professor Schwarzschild argues that:
Limited intervention means a day in court to argue whether the terms of a consent
decree are reasonable, or to suggest alternatives and modifications. This kind of
intervention helps the court to make an informed judgment about the consent decree,
without giving the intervenors a license to scuttle the decree or to delay relief by
litigating the question of the defendant's liability. Restricting the terms of intervention
— not permitting the intervenors to litigate the employer's liability — is consistent
with the attenuated relation of remedy to liability that is characteristic of public law.
Limited intervention is a vehicle for interested third parties to comment on a proposed
decree without being permitted to shift the court's attention away from the remedy
and back to the violation.
Id.
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Professor Schwarzschild suggests several advantages which would flow from these
limited intervention or "fairness" hearings. Most obviously, he asserts, the fairness hear-
ing would force all the parties, and the court, to examine the decree carefully and to
explain why it is desirable. 314 Furthermore, the hearing would include the affected parties
without sacrificing the voluntary nature of consent decrees. 31 ' This inclusion would
afford affected persons a forum to influence the decree, as the union accomplished in
Local Number 93. 316 The fairness hearing may even reconcile the majority employees to
the necessity of the affirmative action plan. In addition, Professor Schwarzschild observes,
if the majority employees are not satisfied with the ultimate consent decree, appellate
courts will have a greater opportunity for informed review when the appellant's objec-
tions are on the record and the district court has responded to them." The abuse of
discretion standard for appellate review of the district court's entry of the decree, he
asserts, would be less of an "incantation" if a meaningful record exists front helow. 318
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the fairness hearing
approach, the Court appears to be cognizant of this position.3 ' 9 In Local Number 93, the
Court reasoned that it was proper not to require the union's approval of the consent
decree in part because the union had been given an opportunity to be heard. 320 In
addition, although the Supreme Court made no reference to the sort of formalized
fairness hearing procedure suggested by Professor Schwarzschild, the Court noted that
the district court had allowed the union to voice its objections to the decree and carefully
considered these objections before rejecting, them."'
The fact that the Court referred the union's potential reverse discrimination claims
back to the district court, however, may indicate that the Court disagrees with Professor
Schwarzschild's suggestion that the intervenors be granted only limited rights. The
Id. at 931, Specifically, Professor Schwarzschild proposes that when parties submit a Title
VII consent decree for judicial approval, the district court should adopt a procedure which includes
the following. First, notice such that affected parties will know of the decree. Second, a fairness
hearing "open to nonparties as well as plaintiff class members." Interested majority employees
should be granted limited intervenor status as the basis of their participation and potentially appeal.
Third, the fairness hearings should be sufficiently detailed that the court may "appreciate the
equities of the situation." Typically, the record should include the statistical evidence of discrimi-
nation upon which the plaintiffs rest their claim. Professor Schwarzschild suggests that several days
may be necessary, particularly where a large employer is involved, but that the hearings should not
become a forum for the litigation of the underlying Claims against the employer. And finally, the
court should articulate the reasoning behind its action, explaining why a particular remedial plan
is justified and including a reasoned response to objections and suggestions. Id. at 929-30.
315 1d.
3115 See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3068-69.
317 Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 931-32.
"a Id. at 931.
319 Although the Court did nut rule on the nature of an intervenor's participation in Local
Number 93, the Court cited Professor Schwarzschild's article to support a less specific proposition
in favor of Title VII consent decrees. Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3076 0.13.
32° Id. at 3079.
32] The Court stated,
Local 93 took full advantage of its opportunity to participate in the District Court's
hearings on the consent decree. It was permitted to air its objections to the reason-
ableness of the decree and to introduce relevant evidence; the district court carefully
considered these objections and explained why it was rejecting them. Accordingly,
"the District Court gave the union all the process that [it] was clue ... ."
Id. at 3079 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, lnc., 445 U.S. 385,400 (1982)).
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Supreme Court specified that consent decrees are not immune from fourteenth amend-
ment or Title VII attack.522 Yet the Court did not indicate exactly what rights the
intervenors would have to bring such claims before the district court, or if the intervenors
could still raise these claims.'" If the Supreme Court meant that the union could fully
litigate those claims, then the Court appears not to support the limited intervention
principle of the fairness hearing. Despite this possible interpretation, however, it seems
likely that the district court could limit the right of the union to litigate any future
challenges in the same manner that the Supreme Court indicated the court could limit
challenges before it entered the decree 3 24 The Supreme Court's decision in Local Number
93 does not offer a clear resolution to this question.
Professor Schwarzschild's limited intervention policy resolves in a general way the
manner in which courts should include intervenors in the consent decree proceeding.
Professor Schwarzschild relies heavily on the active involvement and discretion of the
district court in weighing "the equities" of the particular situation 325 Under his approach,
the court should hear and weigh both the initial evidence of discrimination by the
minority plaintiffs, and the objections of the intervenors, 328 but limit the intervenors only
to the issues relating to the future remedy. In the fairness hearing, majority employees
could assert that the terms of the consent decree are not reasonable, and suggest
alternatives."'
h. Accommodating Equal Protection Claims in a Consent Decree
Professor Schwarzschild does not address the ramifications of an equal protection
challenge to a public employer's affirmative action consent decree. 328 When a public
employer is involved, the Supreme Court's decisions from Bakke to Wygant require that
the public body make sufficient findings of its prior unlawful discrimination before it
may constitutionally implement an affirmative action plan. 929 It would seem an empty
offer to include the majority employees in a fairness hearing but deny them the oppor-
tunity to make their strongest claim against the consent decree: that the employer's
evidentiary findings of discrimination are constitutionally insufficient. Where majority
employees assert equal protection claims within the Title VII negotiation it may be
difficult to reach settlement absent specific evidence of unlawful discrimination.
The problem arises from the conflict between the constitutional requirement of
particularized findings of prior discrimination, and the potential destruction of the
consent decree if majority employees are allowed to fully litigate the sufficiency of these
findings. The Title VII settlement is useful because the parties may agree on a plan
without fully proving past discrimination by the employer.'" This utility would be
undermined if equal protection claims required a specific finding of past discrimination
by a competent body before public employers could implement a valid affirmative action
"2 See id.
323 See id. at 3080.
324 See id,
" 29 Schwarzschild, supra note 5, at 930,932.
328 Id. at 923.
527 Id,
328 Id. at 935.
329 See supra notes 175-232 and accompanying text.
si° See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3079.
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plan. In these circumstances few public employers would take the trouble to settle Title
VII claims if their prior liability had to be publicly litigated regardless of the settlement.
Professor Schwarzschild's proposal requires that courts keep the focus of the fairness
hearing on the propriety of the proposed remedy."' He believes the procedure will not
function if challengers are permitted to question at length the issues of past liabi1ity." 2
In the absence of a constitutional dimension in the case, this approach would work well.
As Professor Schwarzschild points out, only an attenuated relationship exists between
the prior violation and the future remedy in the typical Title VII consent decree."""
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the relationship between Title VII and
the equal protection clause, however, it is not clear whether the fairness hearing proce-
dures satisfy the constitutional requirements."'
Whether majority employees are permitted to challenge the issue of the public
employer's past discrimination depends upon the interpretation of the equal protection
clause. If the courts interpret the Constitution to require extensive, contemporaneous,
and conclusive findings of discrimination to support affirmative action, then majority
employees working for public employers must be allowed to litigate the issue of prior
discrimination, and courts must sacrifice the goal of voluntary settlement before the
constitutional mandate. But if courts interpret the constitutional requirement of findings
of prior discrimination less stringently, courts may reconcile Title VII and the Consti-
tution and thereby preserve the consent decree for public employers.
Justice O'Connor noted the anomalous result of the more restrictive interpretation
of the equal protection clause in her Wygant concurrence."5 She observed that this
interpretation would forbid public employers from correcting the unlawful discrimina-
tion that private employers could remedy voluntarily."' In order to avoid this unsatis-
factory result Justice O'Connor outlined an interpretation of the equal protection clause
that would resolve the conflict between voluntary racial remedies and the findings
requirement of the Constitution,
For equal protection challenges to voluntary affirmative action, Justice O'Connor
proposed the application of a test similar to that proposed in the Title VII Weber case."'
Justice O'Connor would find that evidence sufficient to support a prima facie disparate
impact claim under Title VII would also provide the firm basis required to conclude
that there is a compelling remedial purpose under the equal protection clause." 9 Just as
under Title VII, Justice O'Connor explained, this conclusion would give rise to a re-
buttable inference that the plan is appropriate to remedy apparent prior discrimina-
tion.""" Majority employees would then "be given the opportunity to prove that the plan
does not meet the constitutional standard." 94° As challengers, the Justice concluded, the
majority employees would have to convince the court that the evidence does not support
"' Schwarzschild, supra note 5, 923.
5"Y
"I id.
"' See supra notes 314-24 and accompanying text.
""5
	
106 S. Ct. at 1854-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
556 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
537 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text describing the
Weber 'I'itle VII requirements.
"3" See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1854-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"54"
	
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
•54° Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the inference of discrimination, or that "the plan instituted on the basis of this evidence
was not sufficiently narrowly tailored" to redress the prior discrimination."'
Justice O'Connor proposed this constitutional analysis in Wygant in response to an
affirmative action plan negotiated in the collective bargaining agreement between the
school board and the teachers. She sought to articulate a standard which would preserve
voluntary affirmative action by not requiring the employer to prove prior guilt and
liability. Justice O'Connor appears to suggest that challengers to the affirmative action
plan embodied in such nonjudicial settlements should have full and traditional access to
the courts, just as the teachers did in Wygant .342 Under the less stringent equal protection
analysis she proposed, the employers defending reverse discrimination claims could rely
on non-individualized statistical evidence to sustain their affirmative action plans.
Although Wygant did not involve a judicially approved consent decree, Justice
O'Connor's approach can be modified for use in consent decree proceedings. Justice
O'Connor's proposal provides an excellent vehicle for reconciling the equal protection
constitutional requirements with the operation of the fairness hearing procedure pro-
posed by Professor Schwarzschild. If courts accept a constitutional evidentiary standard
similar to that outlined by Justice O'Connor, the fairness hearing could accommodate
the equal protection requirements which govern public sector affirmative action.
The Justice's reasoning could be applied to the consent decree fairness hearing
process in the following manner. During the hearings, the nonminority intervenors
would have the opportunity to object not only to the particulars of the remedy, but also
to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to justify the racial preferences, the com-
petence of the employer to determine the past discrimination, and the reach and oper-
ation of the decree. The intervenors would have the right to present evidence that would
tend to rebut the evidence of the minority plaintiffs and the employer. The intervenors
would not have the right to raise and formally litigate reverse discrimination claims,
however, any more than they could litigate and defend the original discrimination claims
against the employer under Professor Schwarzschild's proposal. The court would hear
evidence and arguments in a less formal manner than traditional litigation, and would
not make findings of fact or conclusions of law. Instead, the court should consider the
intervenor's evidence that the remedy is unconstitutional as part of the balance of the
equities in examining the decree.
In examining a proposed consent decree, courts should follow the analysis of Van-
guards and Bratton and consider whether the plan is "reasonably related to the objective
of remedying prior discrimination," and whether the plan is "fair and reasonable to
nonminorities affected by it." 343 Specifically, in making the determination whether to
approve the decree, courts should apply standards similar to those first enunciated in
Weber. 344 This approach comports with the general reasoning of Justice O'Connor's
"' Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted:
The institution of such a challenge does not automatically impose upon the public
employer the burden of convincing the court of its liability for prior unlawful discrim-
ination; nor does it mean that the court must make an actual finding of prior discrim-
ination based on the employer's proof before the employer's affirmative action plan
will be upheld.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
342 Id. (O'Connor, J,, concurring).
343 Vanguards, 753 F.2d at 484 (citing Bratton, 704 F.2d at 887).
344 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
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Wygant concurrence.'''' The Vanguard court formulated these standards as follows: first,
a consent decree may not contain an affirmative action plan unless the employer has
employed minorities in a lesser proportion than the relevant labor market; second, the
plan cannot require the firing and replacement of nonminority workers with minority
workers; third, the plan cannot "create an absolute bar to the advancement of nonmi-
nority employees;" and finally, the decree must he temporary and must terminate "when
the underutilization of minorities has been corrected." 346 Intervenors could argue that
the consent decree violates one of these standards. If the district court approves the
decree, the intervenors may appeal, and the appellate court would review the decision
using an abuse of discretion standard. 347
In this process the court should play a active role in regard to the constitutional
claims similar to that suggested by Professor Schwarzschild for Title VII objections. 348
11, after hearing from all the parties, the court finds that the consent decree is fair and
reasonable, the court should enter the decree. Upon approving a consent decree the
court should address the constitutional objections and state why the majority employees
did not convince the court of their case against the decree.
It is possible, therefore, to resolve the issues raised by majority employees in Title
VII consent decree proceedings. Courts should no longer resort to the procedural device
of precluding majority employees with a strict timeliness requirement and the dismissal
of subsequent suits. Instead, courts should permit intervenors to object to the terms of
the consent decree, and to suggest less onerous alternatives. In the public sector, courts
also should permit intervenors to challenge the constitutionality of the affirmative action
remedy, including the opportunity to introduce evidence that would tend to rebut the
findings of prior discrimination by the employer. 513 For this process to function, courts
should interpret the equal protection clause not to require a significantly more demand-
ing evidentiary standard than that provided by a prima facie Title VII pattern or practice
claim.35 °
CONCLUSION
Title VII consent decrees offer an important vehicle for employers to voluntarily
eliminate their part in "traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy"351 by
making significant institutional changes in their personnel policies. Because consent
decrees operate on a broad structural level, however, their use has embroiled the courts
in the problems of the right of third parties to intervene, and the manner in which to
accommodate their objections. The problem is especially acute when the consent decree
involves a public employer because the challenging party may raise the separate require-
ments of the equal protection clause. The Supreme Court has provided little guidance
in the resolution of these questions.
A fairness hearing procedure with limited intervention rights for third parties can
offer a forum to majority employees without sacrificing the advantages of a negotiated
313
 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1852-57.
346 Vanguards, 753 F.2d at 484.
347 Id.
349 See supra notes 310-318 and accompanying text.
349 See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3079-80.
3" See, e.g., Vanguards, 753 F.2d at 484.
331 Weber, 493 U.S. at 204.
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settlement to the principal parties. Courts should follow this procedure because the
alternative is to restrict the use of voluntary affirmative action, and thereby slow the
process of integration at all levels of the workplace. Courts should not back away from
the promise of federal antidiscrimination laws to open opportunities to minorities long
closed by "an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history." 352
WILLIAM T. MATLACK
"2
 Albermarle Paper v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
